This has been a prolonged spell of mass mobilisation that have brought governments to their knees, even when they have not resulted in regime change. Think Sri Lanka, Kenya, Nepal, Madagascar – making the Bangladesh story part of a pattern, but of course, with important differences. Tracing developments in Bangladesh a year on is therefore of interest to societies and governments well beyond its borders.

The immediate consequence of this political rupture was a breakdown in law and order. The police – across the hierarchy – were viewed as closely associated with the previous administration’s actions. In several districts, police stations were attacked, and officers faced intimidation, and many officers fled. These developments, coupled with administrative reshuffles, left behind a weakened and demoralised law enforcement apparatus. In the following months, there were several reports of intimidation of minorities (mainly Hindus), as well as harassment of women in public spaces. The government’s response was cautious, often downplaying incidents in an attempt to avoid inflaming tensions further. Yet this has contributed to a perception that the IG’s control over local administration remains partial, and public confidence in the new order, tentative.

This has been a challenging year for Bangladesh, defined by high expectations and growing impatience. The IG embarked on a slew of reforms soon after taking office. These have included initiatives on judicial reform, police restructuring, anti-corruption, public administration, and electoral oversight. Each has, in different ways, encountered a classic dilemma: a long list of reforms, an attempt to check off every area of concern, ambition running ahead of political feasibility and state capability. Well-meaning Bangladeshi experts dove into this mission. However, building consensus among political actors – especially around sensitive issues such as curbing executive power or restructuring the judiciary – has proved difficult. Political buy-in has remained elusive even as parties signed up to the July Charter.

The political landscape itself continues to evolve. The ban on the Awami League was expected, but is increasingly being contested – a good number of their voters remain intact. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) remains cautiously optimistic and are nurturing their hopes of returning to power after nearly two decades. Meanwhile, the lifting of the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami’s political participation brought it formally back into the mainstream. Notably, in September 2025, Jamaat’s student wing secured victories in the Dhaka and Jahangirnagar university elections. While campus outcomes must not be extrapolated to predict trends in national politics, they do signal a shift among young voters, many of whom may be searching for alternatives beyond the traditional political divides. This is a second dilemma – democratic freedom is for everyone, even groups that progressives dislike and fear.

The Monsoon Revolution succeeded in altering the political scene, but hasn’t quite transformed it. Three fault lines, that I had written about a year ago, remain critical in understanding where Bangladesh stands today: religion and identity, political structure and executive power, and the prospects of economic recovery.

The first fault line concerns religion and identity, especially among the country’s youth. During the political mobilisation of 2024, the Jamaat played a visible role on the streets. With the interim governing arrangement in place, questions about the place of religion in public life have resurfaced. Local Jamaat activists have pushed agendas that severely hurt the social freedoms that women and girls enjoy. Of course, a largely rural and lower-income population in Bangladesh continues to express strong conservative social values, in contrast with the more plural, urban middle class that dominate the political and social discourse. Managing this divergence therefore remains one of the most complex tasks for the IG as it prepares the country for general elections.

Since Jamaat’s return to politics, its local networks have become more active in parts of rural Bangladesh, while in Dhaka and other cities, its influence has largely been confined to rallies and student mobilisation. Balancing the expansion in political participation with the need to safeguard pluralism and minority rights will be one of the defining challenges for the next phase of transition.

The second fault line lies within the political structure itself, and is closely related to the first. The IG had an opportunity to initiate structural reforms aimed at limiting Executive discretion, strengthening independent institutions, and addressing the long-standing overlap between business and politics. Several Bangladeshi analysts and observers of politics point out that the concentration of power in the Executive is at the heart of the institutional degradation in the country. Over time, a system of political patronage that emerged from this centralisation became the principle organising principle of both Bangladeshi politics and its economy. Over time, with years of unchecked extraction from the economy, the wheels are bound to come off, as they did in Bangladesh.

Several commissions have been established by the IG to examine the judiciary, public administration, police, and elections. Consultations have taken place, reports produced, and commitments made to greater transparency. Yet progress has been slow, underlining the fact that reforms in this arena require the buy-in of the political class as well as the business class – both of whom are currently biding their time and watching events unfold. This a reflection of the political economy of reform – institutions that would be subject to greater scrutiny under new rules are often those with the most influence over the reform process itself. And without shifting the incentives of those who wield power in society, no meaningful change can be made.

The third fault line is the economy. Economic pressures – domestic and external – have persisted. The World Bank cut Bangladesh’s growth projection for FY25 to 3.3%, the lowest in over a decade. Private credit and investment are low. Revenue mobilisation is slow, and tax reform (especially reforms to the National Board of Revenue) have faced serious resistance. The fiscal deficit remains high, and the FY26 revenue targets look ambitious given limited administrative capacity. The banking sector remains under strain, with the magnitude of non-performing loans finally coming to the fore. Efforts by the Bangladesh Bank to tighten oversight and improve transparency are ongoing but will take time to bear fruit.

International partners, including the IMF and World Bank, have stepped in with policy-based lending to support macro-economic and financial sector stability. The effectiveness of these instruments, however, will depend on the government’s ability to persist with reforms even after tiding over the immediate economic crisis. And as before, the route to sustainable recovery is financial sector institutions rebuilding credibility, diversifying exports, and attracting investment into sectors beyond garments. It is also about rebuilding confidence amidst a chaotic global economic environment. Trade barriers are rising, aid budgets are shrinking, and geopolitical tensions are rewriting the rules of globalisation that Bangladesh has in the past been able to benefit from.

Overall, progress has been steady but slow. Bangladesh remains at a crossroads even a year after the Monsoon Revolution. Progress will depend on the political consensus that emerges around the basic rules of the game – and crucially, on how the next government chooses to shape these rules, not just follow them. The danger is that it simply revives the old playbook which have been successful for spells of time, but had evidently left deep cleavages that tore the country apart. A new political compact that aligns political stability, growth, and institutional reform is what is needed to rebuild trust with citizens. This offers the best chance of avoiding the cycle in Bangladesh that ended with Hasina’s fall.

Suvojit Chattopadhyay
Head of Africa

Suvojit previously served as ASI’s Country Manager in Bangladesh, where he led research and advocacy initiatives on green growth policies across key economic sectors.

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of  ASI (Adam Smith International).